24.02.2007

Iraq, these days, looks like George Miller's Mad Max – a post-Apocalyptic terrain. The civil war there is more complicated than any other civil war: it, too, looks post-Apocalyptic. Most interestingly, non-violent ethnic cleansing in the form of a forced exodus has been silently but significantly altering the Iraq's demographics.

About a million Sunni Iraqis have fled to Syria, and over 750,000 to Jordan. Add to that nearly 200,000 “better off” Sunni Iraqis who have fled to the West and countless casualties, simple mathematics will show that 35-45 percent of Iraq's Sunni population have disappeared since the beginning of the war. If the inexorable exodus continues linearly, Iraq may consist of only Kurds and Shiites in five years time.

Although Shiites are the major target of violence in Iraq, Sunnis often fall victim to Death Squads orchestrated by the Mehdi Army and other less known violent Shiites groups. The Sunnis are forced to “depart” especially in mixed neighborhoods. Presently, the Sunnis are confined in their own neighborhoods in Baghdad and its enclaves and the hopeless desert town called Al Anbar.

Ostensibly, it should be good news for the Americans that so many Sunnis tend to disappear. However, in reality, the ones who disappear are the relatively harmless ones – the radical Sunnis who often resort to violence probably have no intention to leave. The exodus means the remaining Sunni populace is being marginalized at a pace unseen elsewhere.

True, the exodus promises less logistical support for the radical Sunnis in the longer term and a “smaller target area.” Nevertheless, in insurgency fighting it is often the “quality” rather than the “quantity” that matters.

The exodus may also misleadingly promise bigger control over non-Kurdish Iraq by the Shiites. But then how much good news would that be for Iraq's occupiers? How much good news for the Shiites themselves? Would a linearly progressing Sunni exodus not mean Shiite control over two-thirds of Iraqi territory? How desirable would that be for Washington? How much, for Tehran? Is this not, in practical terms, Iran invading (non-Kurdish) Iraq without shooting a single bullet? So, are we heading for two Iraqs instead of three?

Can the Shiites and Kurds co-habit in a federal or split Iraq as peaceful neighbors? Any answer to that question would probably be premature. The Shiites are already divided over how best to treat the Kurds. It is no secret that the Mehdi Army does not much fancy the Kurds. However, the Shiite-controlled Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) advocates reconciliation with Washington and its Kurdish allies. Worse, the two Shiite fractions, too, are at odds with each other.

Add to the entire picture the presently quiet north, which may in the future become much less quiet, Iraq looks like a real-life Mad Max movie. One thing is certain, though. The disappearance of relatively reasonable Sunnis from the picture will further minimize the chances for a historic settlement that is already too remote a possibility. Iraq is heading fast to a point where there will be no winners but plenty of losers, its occupiers and neighbors included.

Under these circumstances, it is understandable that the United States must “invest” more rather than “give up.” The Bush administration's psychology over Iraq resembles to that of loan sharks who have made bad investments.

Typically, a loan shark who lent to a business that tends to collapse feels urged to lend more to save that business – and his initial investment. Each time the added investment too collapses, the lender thinks he must invest more because with each failure the amount that is at stake is bigger. That, inevitably, is the American psychology over Iraq.

Perhaps the best way for the lender to save the debtor and his own investment could be to seek assistance from “other businesses in the industry” who may lose if the entire industry collapsed because of this hopeless lending affair.